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Abstract - This paper is a research in progress paper
outlining an approach using open source IDS (Snort) and
honeypot (nepenthes, honeyd) technologies to create a
resilient layered defensive approach for SCADA and
control systems networks.
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Introduction

There is a growing discipline of network forensics with
traditional Ethernet networks running TCP/IP. This is a
discipline that utilizes networking science to investigate
problems of network malfeasance both pre and ante
incident. Packet capture and subsequent interpretation of
the network dump files of packets and protocols whether
this be in near real time or post incident provides invaluable
insights into attacks. The capture files can be replayed and
analysed until such time as a causation is found for a
particular incident.
There are a range of commonly available packet capture
and analysis utilities available for the modern network
forensics practitioner. Most of these tools are dominated by
the analysis of TCP/IP protocol suite and its inherent issues,
whether these issues be at the actual packet level reaching
through various protocols up to the final presentation of the
network stream at the application layer. From this plethora
of available open source and commercial tools there are a
limited number of tools that natively tackle the protocols
that are in the SCADA domain such as ModBUS, DNP3.
This research is aimed at utilizing relevant open source
tools namely Wireshark, Etherape and Snort IDS to provide
a platform for detecting, reporting, capturing, analyzing and
ameliorating network borne threats to SCADA and control
systems networks. An extension to this work is planned in
that once these threats and modes of compromise are better
known and understood then the development of customized
detection modules for deployment in honeypots namely
honeyd and nepenthes is planned.
Throughout the remainder of the paper the term SCADA
will be used to encompass all protocols and systems used to
control SCADA and industrial control system networks.
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The need to protect SCADA

There is little argument that SCADA and control networks
need protections from network borne attacks or
malfeasance. There are a range of documented issues
relating to SCADA or control system networks. The reports
from various agencies indicate that SCADA systems as
highly vulnerable to attack or compromise that would result
in catastrophic failure of national critical infrastructures and
ultimately the economic well being of that nation.
SCADA and control system networks drive much of the
wealth generation processes of the modern industrial
complex. Many of these systems are used to run the modern
industrial complexes that supply modern Western nations
with many of the services and goods that they take for
granted. These systems are to be found in but not limited to
petroleum complexes, power generation grids, water supply
networks, sewerage networks and most other complex
systems that require constant computer-based monitoring or
control. Compromise or even minor disruption to these
systems could have catastrophic outcomes and downstream
consequences resulting in massive economic impact or
significant loss of life[1-5].
Significant disruption to any one of these critical
infrastructures through deliberate attack or inadvertent
attacks such as the SQL slammer worm [4] can inflict
catastrophic long term economic damage to that goes well
beyond the cost of the material damage to the infrastructure
itself. Disruption of gas services as result of an industrial
mishap in Western Australia alone in 2008 almost saw that
States economy grind to a halt [3]. The loss of capacity at ~
40% was sufficient to have considerable downstream
effects that for instance caused laundry for hospitals to be
shipped in from other Australian states until increased
supplies could be obtained.
SCADA devices/systems are built to run, monitor or control
a particular process typically as a part of combined
automated process that results in a “product”. Many of
these devices and systems in which they operate are
intended to run for the life of the project, mine or product
cycle which can be decades not weeks. As a result SCADA
systems have a larger than expected level of legacy
hardware and software installed, the old engineering adage
if it is not broken do not fix it was a paragon in many of
these systems. This was a perfectly acceptable paradigm in
which to operate when many of these companies/entities
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did not connect to any network except their own production
or engineering network, and were never connected to the
corporate network that is then possibly connected to the
Internet. This phenomenon has now changed as smaller
companies merge and combine to become bigger entities as
the pressure of globalisation and economic rationalisation
increase. This leads to network infrastructures that are often
comprised of different disjointed legacy network systems.
Further adding to the entropy with respect to the security
stability is the attachment of the corporate network and the
increasing use of the Internet as a backbone network into
the vanguard of SCADA networks.
Many older SCADA and control systems were proprietary
systems with protected proprietary protocols and related
processes. These legacy systems are now being upgraded
and are being moved to open platform systems that utilise
open protocols such as Distributed Network Protocol 3
(DNP3). New generation SCADA systems also use modern
open standard communications protocols and networks to
provide access to the SCADA systems for control and
command. These networks even if totally private will
almost atypically run the TCP/IP range of protocols and
supporting services. Many providers due to costs are also
replacing dedicated hard physical links to control/command
interfaces commonly refererred to as HMI (Human
Machine Interfaces) with ethernet or wireless links.
Consequently, some of this SCADA or control traffic may
actually travel on or rely upon open networks such as the
Internet to provide these control conduits that were once
private and fixed. Of greater risk is that some of these
systems utilise open protocol wireless systems such as
2.4Ghz WiFi for these command and control conduits.
Various reports as far back as the late 1990s have indicated
the need for better diligence when dealing with these
systems. The knowledge of SCADA vulnerability is now
spreading into the hacker or blackhat communities with
systems such as the Metasploit framework having several
specific SCADA exploits now installed for use and
available publicly. One of the problems is that the SCADA
community still believes that security via obscurity, the
keeping of a secret in this increasingly inter-connected and
global world is a viable and sustainable option.
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The research approach

This research is aimed at providing a working framework
for testing, modifying and where possible providing remedy
for known and published vulnerability of SCADA and
control systems. It does not seek nor does it not intend to
provide a platform for exploit development. This quasiexperimental research is aimed at producing systems
hardened against incursions from would be attackers using
known vulnerability or exploit to penetrate systems or
simply to disrupt systems. Later on when combined with
honeypot technologies the ability to track or capture zero
day exploits will also be a possibility.
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The two main protocols that will be initially examined in
this research are ModBUS and DNP3. It is not the intent of
this paper to provide an in depth analysis of DNP3 or
ModBUS protocols. These types of open protocol will be
used increasingly as a result of the growing convergence of
technologies and the business imperatives to have these
types of supporting systems for billing and asset control. It
should be noted that in the SCADA and control systems
space there is the use of various proprietary protocols and
they are not well represented at this stage in the open source
community. The research approach is to produce a robust
method and architecture for forensic examination of
network borne threats using DNP3 and ModBUS as vectors
and then apply lessons learned over other less known
protocols in the space.
Experimental Procedure for Snort SCADA
1.Environmental Scanning
This will include scanning of blackhat, hacker,
vendor and CERT sites for vulnerability
announcements or trace. The only restriction is
that the exploit be network borne, it does not
specifically have to attack the underlying network
protocol but could also be malicious payload or
instructions for a PLC.
2.Production of Replay/Replication of vulnerability
This stage will involve the production of the
vulnerability for replay via a script or code base
preferably. This also allows for easy testing and
verification of the exploit.
3.Analysis of vulnerability
This is the extended analysis of the modus
operandi of the exploit. Seeing what limits or
bounds are contained in the vulnerability/exploit
itself.
4.Creation of IDS rulesets
There are 3 sub-stages for this stage. At some
stages of the process it may only be able to achieve
identification i.e the attack is unstoppable
a. to identify
b. to reduce/stop attack
c. extensive logging
5.Testing of the ruleset
Testing of the ruleset for resilience when under
sustained attack.
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Unlike IDS rule development that we currently use for
reducing or eliminating risk the SCADA or control systems
space has some unique requirements. In conventional
IDS/IPS a perfectly acceptable paradigm is the denial
access for the malicious packets either by dropping them or
dropping the routing for the packets. This modus operandii
for a number of reasons is not acceptable in the SCADA
environment. Due to the requirement for most SCADA
systems need to have regular and continual communication
between devices and controllers a denial of route or packet
may cause a system to fail or shutdown at best. Failure to
communicate to a device in a SCADA network may have
catastrophic downstream consequences.
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Experimental Environment

For each identified attack the attack is perpetrated against a
simple experimental network as designed below. The
100Mb hub and use of the same subnet in this case
192.168.1.0/24 allowing for the promiscuous sniffing of
network traffic by various utilities. The network machines
are a combination of VMWare instances and physical
hardware that as previously mentioned could be rapidly
redeployed. All machines are time synchronized by ntp
services to the same timestamp before the start of an
experimental run.
100Mbit Hub
Ad-hoc Secondary Network
Link for System logging
Victim
192.168.1.20
Attacker
192.168.1.30
External System Logger

Sniffer
Forensic Collector

Snort IDS
192.168.1.1

192.168.1.2

Figure 1: Network Design

interface separate to the one being sniffed as indicate in the
network design.
Snort IDS
A VMWare based image based on Debian was developed.
The Snort IDS system used the base network install for i386
platform. Then the Snort IDS with PostgreSQL database
extensions was installed. In addition Wireshark, tcpdump
and Etherape were installed. Several Snort IDS analysis
frontends were installed with the primary interface being
the ACID/BASE hybrid frontend. The system also had X
Windows installed although strictly not used on secure
production servers its use and installation enabled faster
analysis of the experiments. The final system is used as a
baseline system for each experimental run undertaken. This
has allowed a consistent approach to the experimentation
and a reduction of compounding variables in that the
experiments all start with same software and configurations.
Where a Snort IDS ruleset was in existence this was utilized
to initially detect the attack upon replay of packets that
should be addressed by the IDS ruleset. Where no rule
existed rule development is taken as per stage 4 of the
experimental procedure which is produce a ruleset to
identify, then extend (where possible) a ruleset to
ameliorate or stop, and then an extended ruleset to observe
and document the attack more thoroughly.
Network Sniffer/Forensic Collector
This is a VMware instance that is a forensic collector
designed to forensically capture all network traffic and
response generated. The system simply creates a tcpdump
binary capture file of the network sessions for later analysis
via various tools and techniques.
Attacker
This is typically a simple Debian base installation with
scripting languages and appropriate attack tools installed to
realize the attack. On occasion the use of bootable Linux
CD security implementations such as Backtrack will be
used as the attack platform. All attacks are preferably
executed from a script or compiled code base for
consistency of attack profile or mode of operation.

5
Victim/Target Machine
This is constructed as a raw default installed machine but
where possible live configurations will be obtained from
SCADA and control systems users/operators. Failing the
availability of sample live configurations then the default
configuration from the software vendors will be deployed
for testing.
For each victim or target machine where possible
performance logging and monitoring will be gathered to aid
forensic analysis, but not at the expense of experimental
situation reflecting operational realities. Preferably all
logging or system logging will go out on another network

Discussion

This is a research project that is in progress. The aim of the
project is to produce a reliable technological framework for
the investigation of network borne threats to SCADA and
control system environments. The framework will allow for
production of Snort signatures for the SCADA and control
systems environments using open source tools as the
platform. This is the first stage in the development of a
hardened network architecture for SCADA and control
systems.
From these forensically verified signatures the development
of emulation scripts for deployment in the honeyd honeypot
system will be undertaken. Honeyd also has a tarpitting
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capability that can be used to slow down or resource
exhaust an attacker. The principle modus operandii for this
honeypot will be competent emulation of a SCADA system
with vulnerability.
In addition it is planned to where applicable to create
specific vulnerability modules for use with the nepenthes
honeypot system as well. Nepenthes honeypot is designed
to principally collect malicious codes in the form of
shellcode or custom built binaries. It does this by fooling an
attacker into believing they have exploited the machines
vulnerability and can “oWn” the machine by the download
and execution of malicious code. Nepenthes via its
emulation of actions makes the attacker or bot surrender the
malcode. These two honeypots will allow a significant
opportunity to provide a defence in depth approach to
protecting these networks and network protocols from
known attacks and vulnerabilities. It will also provide the
ability to track zero day exploits or vulnerabilities.

7
[1]
[2]
[3]

[5]

Honeypots

IDS
Firewall

By producing the honeypot layers and IDS they will take
load off of the systems and also isolate response away from
critical assets. The integration and layering of defence from
the firewall to IDS to honeypot should produce a highly
resilient architecture to attacks on SCADA systems.

Conclusion

There is strong evidence that the installation of a hardened,
up to date IDS system that is placed at the network
perimeter or intersection can yield significant protection for
networks. The problem is manifest in making sure that the
IDS is current and hardened against known exploits.
This research aims to provide a reliable system for the rapid
production of IDS rulesets for amelioration of threat to
SCADA and control networks. It will extend the resilience
by combining firewall – IDS – honeypot integration and
awareness of exploits and vulnerability. These three
technologies should provide a hardened series of barriers by
chaining and tight integration of defensive technologies.
The further research to use the
honeypot technology should allow
from would be attackers or mishap
technology but also as a collector

This combination of open source technologies, SCADA
operator knowledge and targeted vulnerability and exploit
research should produce a hardened resilient infrastructure
for use by the SCADA community with the end result being
critical infrastructures better protected from cyber attack.

[4]

Asset
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motivations. These can then be examined and used to
further harden network defences by the production of new
IDS rules.

identified attacks in
significant protection
principally as a tarpit
of attack modes and
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